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after California Dental Association
Herbert Hovenkampt
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the antitrust laws certain agreements among competi-
tors are considered to be so clearly anticompetitive that they are
unlawful "per se."' Judicial experience is said to be sufficient to
convince courts that such practices are unreasonable as a class.2
This means that a more inquiring examination into such things
as market power or specific anticompetitive effects is so unlikely
to produce a different result that it is not worth the significant
additional costs.
Other agreements, which typically involve joint production or
distribution, are thought to have significant potential to reduce
costs, increase output, improve the product or service, or other-
wise please customers. While these arrangements might also be
anticompetitive, this can be shown only by a full rule-of-reason
inquiry into market power, and anticompetitive effects must be
proven.'
t Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa.
1 Herbert Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
Their Application 1910 at 252-65 (Aspen 1998). See also Arizona v Maricopa County Medi-
cal Society, 457 US 332, 348 (1982) (applying the per se rule of invalidity to a prepaid medical
plan involving maximum price fixing among 1750 physicians acting in a nonexclusive ar-
rangement); United States v Topco Associates, Inc, 405 US 596, 608 (1972) (applying per se
rule to a purchasing and retail branding joint venture among grocers lacking market power in
their assigned territories).
2 See Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 441 US 1, 2 (1979)
("It is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts
classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act."), quoting Topco Associates, 405 US
at 607-08. See also FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 US 411, 433
(1990) ("Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict
with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive pre-
sumption that the restraint is unreasonable."), quoting Maricopa County, 457 US at 344;
NCAA v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 100-01 (1984) (stating
that 'judicial experience" determines when per se rule should be applied).
3 Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law 1912 at 282-303 (cited in note 1). See also Board of
Trade of City of Chicago v United States, 246 US 231 (1918) (holding that not all horizontal
agreements between competitors are anticompetitive).
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In between these two extremes lies a range of conduct and
structural possibilities that may require something more than
per se disposal, but something less than a full blown rule-of-
reason inquiry.4 This class of conduct might be defined as highly
suspicious but not unambiguously anticompetitive, perhaps be-
cause courts lack sufficient experience with it. Depending on the
circumstances, a court might be justified in condemning such
conduct without a market power inquiry, or with an attenuated
inquiry; or it might require relatively less proof of anticompetitive
effects. Not all of these "quick look" inquiries are alike, and the
inquiry varies with the structure of the market and the nature of
the threat.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that some restraints
can be condemned without "a detailed market analysis," or that
certain restraints are sufficiently suspicious to "requir[e] some
competitive justification" even when specific anticompetitive ef-
fects have not been proven.5 Nevertheless, as the Court noted in
California Dental Association v FTC,6 "our categories of analysis
of anticompetitive effects are less fixed than terms like 'per se,'
'quick look,' and 'rule of reason' tend to make them appear," and
no "bright line" separates them.7 Some restraints create an "in-
tuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect," while others
"call for more detailed" market analysis.8 In all cases,
[tihe object is to see whether the experience of the market
has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident
conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction
will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place
of a more sedulous one. And of course what we see may
vary over time, if rule-of-reason analyses in case after case
reach identical conclusions
" Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law $ 1911 at 267 (cited in note 1). See also Orson v Mira-
max Film Corp, 79 F3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir 1996) (stating that an "abbreviated rule-of-reason"
applies "where per se condemnation is inappropriate, but where a full-blown industry analysis
is not required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an inherently suspect re-
straint").
r California Dental Association v FTC, 526 US 756, 779 (1999) (holding that a "quick
look" analysis was not appropriate for analyzing the association's advertising restrictions).
6 526 US 756 (1999).
7 Id at 779.
8 Id at 781.
9 Id.
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The Supreme Court then held that dentists' horizontal agree-
ments restricting advertising of price and quality should be ad-
dressed under a complete rule of reason, rather than the more
truncated inquiries that the Federal Trade Commission and the
Ninth Circuit below had employed.1"
This Article examines the' implications of the California Den-
tal Association decision for future antitrust analysis of collabora-
tions among competitors. First, Part I briefly summarizes the
majority's approach to the competitor collaboration at issue and
the contrasting approach taken by Justice Breyer and three other
dissenters. Part II then considers the respective duties of the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")11 and the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals to (1) identify the proper rule of antitrust to be applied,
whether per se, rule of reason, or some intermediate form of
analysis; and (2) marshal the facts justifying the decision under
the rule being applied. Part III then examines some of peculiari-
ties in the rule-of-reason inquiry developed by the California
Dental Association majority, particularly its definition of "output"
in the affected market. It also considers whether the Court meant
to revive a regime that gave greater antitrust deference to re-
straints in the learned professions, considers whether the re-
straint in California Dental Association is best defined as "naked"
or "ancillary," and evaluates the role of justifications and less re-
strictive alternatives in antitrust analysis of competitor collabo-
ration. Finally, Part IV argues that California Dental Association
gives Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence an indefensible jux-
taposition of concerns. The Court's recent monopolization deci-
sions indicate extreme concern about the anticompetitive poten-
tial of strategic behavior by single firms. In contrast, the Califor-
nia Dental Association majority seems excessively sanguine about
the threats posed by collusive conduct, particularly when unac-
companied by any significant joint productive activity. This jux-
taposition of concerns should be reversed.
In California Dental Association, the dentists were not en-
gaged in significant joint productive activity. Rather, they were
organized into a professional association collectively making ethi-
cal rules. On their face, the challenged rules were designed to
control false and misleading advertising, but they had been ap-
plied in an unusually aggressive manner. According to the FTC,
10 California Dental Association, 526 US at 759.
11 Or the district court, in a lawsuit brought by the Justice Department or a private
plaintiff.
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they had been used to condemn many instances of truthful, non-
deceptive advertising.12 Justice Breyer's dissent, with no dis-
agreement from the majority, characterized the facts this way:
IT]he Dental Association's "advisory opinions and
guidelines indicate that ... descriptions of prices as 'rea-
sonable' or 'low' do not comply" with the Association's rule
.... [I1n "numerous cases" the Association "advised mem-
bers of objections to special offers, senior citizen discounts,
and new patient discounts, apparently without regard to
their truth" . . . . [01ne advisory opinion "expressly states
that claims as to the quality of services are inherently
likely to be false or misleading," all "without any particu-
lar consideration of whether" such statements were "true
or false.""
The Commission ... referred to instances in which the
Association, without regard for the truthfulness of the
statements at issue, recommended denial of membership
to dentists wishing to advertise, for example, "reasonable
fees quoted in advance," "major savings," or "making teeth
cleaning... inexpensive."14
The California Dental Association's rules on discount adver-
tising required a dentist wishing to advertise a discount to make
elaborate disclosure of her entire fee schedule, such that "across-
the-board discount advertising in literal compliance with the re-
quirements 'would probably take two pages in the telephone
book."'15 For example, if a dentist performed one hundred differ-
ent services and advertised a "fifteen percent discount to senior
citizens," the guidelines apparently required the dentist to list
both the full price and the discounted price of'each individual
service. The California Dental Association often condemned ad-
vertising claims such as "we guarantee all dental work for 1
12 In re California Dental Association, 121 FTC 190, 270 (1996), affd as FTC v Califor-
nia Dental Association, 128 F3d 720, 729 (9th Cir 1997), affirmance revd and remanded, Cali-
fornia Dental Association, 526 US at 779, vacated, 2000 WL 1239199, *18 (9th Cir) (remand-
ing the dispute to the FTC with instructions to dismiss its case against the California Dental
Association).
13 California Dental Association, 526 US at 783 (Breyer dissenting), quoting California
Dental Association, 128 F3d at 729.
14 California Dental Association, 526 US at 783-4, quoting In re California Dental Asso-
ciation, 121 MTC at 301.
15 California Dental Association, 526 US at 784, quoting In re California Dental Associa-
tion, 121 FrC at 302.
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year," or the "latest in cosmetic dentistry," and "gentle dentistry
in a caring environment.""
On these facts, the Ninth Circuit held that the FTC properly
condemned the California Dental Association's restraints on price
advertising using a "quick look," rather than a "full-blown" rule-
of-reason inquiry.17 The Supreme Court majority disagreed, and
remanded for just such a full-blown inquiry.18
Speaking of earlier decisions in which a "quick look" had been
applied, 9 the Supreme Court observed that:
In each of these cases, which have formed the basis for
what has come to be called abbreviated or "quick-look"
analysis under the rule of reason, an observer with even a
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an anti-
competitive effect on customers and markets."
By contrast, the case before the Court "fail[ed] to present a situa-
tion in which the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is compara-
bly obvious":
In a market for professional services, in which advertising
is relatively rare and the comparability of service pack-
ages not easily established, the difficulty for customers or
potential competitors to get and verify information about
the price and availability of services magnifies the dangers
to competition associated with misleading advertising.
What is more, the quality of professional services tends to
resist either calibration or monitoring by individual pa-
tients or clients.22
16 California Dental Association, 526 US at 784, quoting In re California Dental Associa-
tion, 121 FTC at 308-10.
17 California Dental Association, 128 F3d at 727.
18 See California Dental Association, 526 US at 781.
19 California Dental Association, 526 US at 780. The Court cited FTC v Indiana Federa-
tion of Dentists, 476 US 447, 465-66 (1986) (upholding, as supported by substantial evidence,
the FTC's ruling that an organization's requirement that members withhold x-rays from
insurers was a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act); NCAA, 468 US at 113 (invalidating
League's television regulations that expressly limited output and fixed minimum price); and
National Society of Professional Engineers v United States, 435 US 679, 692-93 (1978) (hold-
ing a society's absolute ban on competitive bidding invalid under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
20 California Dental Association, 526 US at 770.
21 Id.
22 Id at 772, citing Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Mini-
mum Quality Standards, 87 J Pol Econ 1328, 1330 (1979) (arguing that setting minimum
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The Court postulated that:
The existence of such significant challenges to informed
decisionmaking by the customer for professional services
immediately suggests that advertising restrictions argua-
bly protecting patients from misleading or irrelevant ad-
vertising call for more than cursory treatment as obviously
comparable to classic horizontal agreements to limit out-
put or price competition."
Rather,
the [California Dental Association's] advertising restric-
tions might plausibly be thought to have a net procompeti-
tive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition. The
restrictions on both discount and nondiscount advertising
are, at least on their face, designed to avoid false or decep-
tive advertising in a market characterized by striking dis-
parities between the information available to the profes-
sional and the patient.24
The Court emphasized the degree of information failure in the
market for professional services such as dentistry, and regarded
this as requiring at least a receptive hearing for advertising re-
strictions whose stated purpose was to limit deceptive advertis-
ing.
25
quality standards in some markets with information asymmetries will increase social wel-
fare); Barry R. Furrow, et al, 1 Health Law § 3-1 at 86 (West 1995) ("In economic terms, the
market for professional health care services is characterized by market failure: consumers are
incapable of assessing quality due to imperfect information and there is a high risk of negative
externalities or danger to the consumer or third parties.").
23 California Dental Association, 526 US at 773.
24 Id, citing Jack Carr & Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the
Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J L & Econ 307, 309 (1990) ("One feature common to the
markets for complex services is an inherent asymmetry of knowledge about the product: pro-
fessionals supplying the good are knowledgeable; consumers demanding the good are unin-
formed."); George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488 (1970) (illustrating the effects of "quality uncertainty" in mar-
kets characterized by asymmetrical information).
25 California Dental Association, 526 US at 774:
Assuming that the record in fact supports the conclusion that the Cali-
fornia Dental Association disclosure rules essentially bar advertisement
of across-the-board discounts, it does not obviously follow that such a ban
would have a net anticompetitive effect here. Whether advertisements
that announced discounts ... would be less effective at conveying infor-
mation relevant to competition if they listed the original and discounted
prices for [services], than they would be if they simply specified a per-
centage discount across the board, seems to us a question susceptible to
[2000:154
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The majority apparently found it quite easy to distinguish be-
tween limitations on advertising and limitations on the output of
dental services, and of course there is no necessary connection
between them; a bona fide limitation on deceptive advertising
could expand the output of dental services by increasing con-
sumer confidence in dentistry." Thus the real issue was whether
a horizontal restraint limiting the type of advertising at issue
tended to reduce or to enlarge output. The majority was unper-
suaded that the issue was sufficiently clear that it could be satis-
fied on a "quick look.""
The Court conceded that the FTC opinion itself may have
been sufficient to support condemnation of the advertising re-
strictions under the rule of reason. The fault was with the Ninth
Circuit's opinion, which had been too hasty in applying a "quick
look" without a full analysis of the market.28 It then remanded to
empirical but not a priori analysis. In a suspicious world, the discipline of
specific example may well be a necessary condition of plausibility for pro-
fessional claims that for all practical purposes defy comparison shopping.
26 Nevertheless, the Court refused a similar defense in Indiana Federation of Dentists,
rejecting the dentists' claim that an agreement to withhold x-rays from insurers was not a
restriction in the output of dental services. 476 US at 455-56. The Court later classified the
restraint as a "naked restriction on price or output." Id at 460, citing NCAA, 468 US at 109-
10. It then found the requisite impact on competition in the fact that in two locales the insur-
ers had actually been unable to obtain compliance with their requests for x-rays. See Indiana
Federation of Dentists, 476 US at 457. Looking at these effects, the Court concluded that
"[slince the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine
whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, 'proof of
actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output,' can obviate the need for an inquiry
into market power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects.'" Id at 460-61, quoting
Phillip E. Areeda, 7 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application
1511 at 429 (Little, Brown 1986). In sum, Indiana Federation of Dentists identified the
restriction on release of x-rays as a "reduction of output." 476 US at 460 (citation omitted).
27 California Dental Association, 526 US at 779. Significantly, the Court concluded:
[it was] possible that the restrictions might in the final analysis be anti-
competitive. The point, rather, is that the plausibility of competing
claims about the effects of the professional advertising restrictions rules
out the indulgently abbreviated review to which the Commission's order
was treated. The obvious anticompetitive effect that triggers abbreviated
analysis has not been shown.
Id at 778.
28 Id at 779. The Court stated:
In light of our focus on the adequacy of the Court of Appeals's analysis,
Justice Breyer's thorough-going, de novo antitrust analysis contains much
to impress on its own merits but little to demonstrate the sufficiency of
the Court of Appeals's review. The obligation to give a more deliberate
look than a quick one does not arise at the door of this Court and should
not be satisfied here in the first instance. Had the Court of Appeals en-
gaged in a painstaking discussion in a league with Justice Breyer's (com-
pare his 14 pages with the Ninth Circuit's 8), and had it confronted the
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
the Ninth Circuit for fuller consideration under the rule of rea-
son. 
2 9
Justice Breyer dissented." While he also was dissatisfied with
the Ninth Circuit's opinion, he nonetheless found the record ade-
quate to support its judgment. He found the case to involve a
"traditional application of the rule of reason to the facts as found
by the Commission."3' He then would have proceeded by consider-
ing four questions:
(1) What is the specific restraint at issue?
(2) What are its likely anticompetitive effects?
(3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justifications?
(4) Do the parties have sufficient market power to make
a difference?3 2
On the first question, what is the restraint, Justice Breyer
faulted the majority for accepting the California Dental Associa-
tion's statement of its advertising policy at face value as express-
ing the "content" of the restraint.33 The restraint consisted in
what the California Dental Association actually did, rather than
in what it said. While the challenged restraint was nominally "a
promise to refrain from advertising that is 'false or misleading in
any material respect,"'34 in practice this "innocent-sounding ethi-
cal rule" had been implemented in a series of "opinions, guide-
lines, enforcement policies, and review of membership applica-
comparability of these restrictions to bars on clearly verifiable advertis-
ing, its reasoning might have sufficed to justify its conclusion. Certainly
Justice Breyer's treatment of the antitrust issues here is no 'quick look.'
Lingering is more like it, and indeed Justice Breyer, not surprisingly,
stops short of endorsing the Court of Appeals's discussion as adequate to
the task at hand.
Id (emphasis in original).
29 The Court also noted that the FTC had relied entirely on Sherman Act decisions in
its opinion and had given no consideration to the possibility that a more aggressive liabil-
ity standard might obtain under the Federal Trade Commission Act. California Dental
Association, 526 US at 759 n 3, citing the Federal Trade Commission Act, codified at 15
USC § 45(a)(1) (1994). On this question, see Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, 2
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 307 at 21 (Lit-
tle, Brown rev ed 1995). See also id at 302h (Aspen 2d ed 2000).
30 Joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg.
31 California Dental Association, 526 US at 781 (Breyer dissenting).
32 Id at 782.
33 Id at 781.
34 Id at 782, quoting California Dental Association Code of Ethics, § 10 (1993), <http://
www.cda.org/public/coe98.html> (visited May 7, 2000).
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tions" in a manner that "reached beyond its nominal target."35 In
practice, the cited rule:
(1) "precluded advertising that characterized a dentist's
fees as being low, reasonable, or affordable;"
(2) "precluded advertising.., of across the board
discounts;" and
(3) "prohibit[edl all quality claims."36
Justice Breyer noted that the Commission record was far larger
than the very small number of instances cited by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, and showed that the California Dental Association had dis-
ciplined dentists or recommended denial of membership when
they simply advertised such things as "reasonable fees quoted in
advance," "major savings," or "making teeth cleaning ... inex-
pensive," or offered one-year guarantees of work done. 7 Justice
Breyer summarized these various fact findings of the FTC at con-
siderably greater length than had the Ninth Circuit.38
On the issue of likely anticompetitive effects, Justice Breyer
thought that the "anticompetitive tendencies" of the restraints on
price were "obvious" 39 :
An agreement not to advertise that a fee is reasonable,
that service is inexpensive, or that a customer will receive
a discount makes it more difficult for a dentist to inform
customers that he charges a lower price. If the customer
does not know about a lower price, he will find it more dif-
ficult to buy lower price service. That fact, in turn, makes
it less likely that a dentist will obtain more customers by
35 California Dental Association, 526 US at 782 (Breyer dissenting), quoting In re
California Dental Association, 121 FTC at 190.
36 California Dental Association, 526 US at 783, quoting In re California Dental Asso-
ciation, 121 FTC at 301, 308 (alterations in original).
37 California Dental Association, 526 US at 783, citing In re California Dental Asso-
ciation, 121 FTC at 301. The California Dental Association seemed to view a guarantee as
"deceptive" because no one can know for sure how long a particular piece of dental work
will last. But guarantees should be viewed as risk-sharing devices, not as promises that
work will last for a year. A guarantee is simply a promise that if something breaks it will
be replaced or repaired without additional charge. Surely a dentist could make such a
promise just as easily as a toaster manufacturer. Deception might exist, but only if the
dentist makes the promise without intending to honor it.
38 Compare California Dental Association, 526 US at 781-94 (Breyer dissenting), with
California Dental Association, 128 F3d at 723-24.
39 California Dental Association, 526 US at 784.
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offering lower prices. And that likelihood means that den-
tists will prove less likely to offer lower prices.4 °
Justice Breyer also found "serious anticompetitive tendencies"
in the restrictions on quality advertising.41 Patients or their par-
ents may still want to know whether a dentist makes a point of
"gentle care" or is willing to guarantee work for one year.4" Jus-
tice Breyer stated that the record showed anticompetitive effects
from these restraints that were more than hypothetical:
[T]he Commission pointed to record evidence affirmatively
establishing that quality-based competition is important
to dental consumers in California. Unsurprisingly, these
consumers choose dental services based at least in part on
"information about the type and quality of service." Simi-
larly, as the Commission noted, the ALJ credited testi-
mony to the effect that "advertising the comfort of services
will 'absolutely bring in more patients,"' and, conversely,
that restraining the ability to advertise based on quality
would decrease the number of patients that a dentist could
attract.3
40 Id at 784 (Breyer dissenting), citing Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350, 364
(1977) (stating commercial speech plays an "indispensable role in the allocation of re-
sources in a free enterprise system"); Virginia Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc, 425 US 748, 765 (1976) (invalidating Virginia statute that prohib-
ited pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs).
41 California Dental Association, 526 US at 785 (Breyer dissenting).
42 Justice Breyer stated:
To restrict that kind of service quality advertisement is to restrict compe-
tition over the quality of service itself, for, unless consumers know, they
may not purchase, and dentists may not compete to supply that which
will make little difference to the demand for their services. That, at any
rate, is the theory of the Sherman Act. And it is rather late in the day for
anyone to deny the significant anticompetitive tendencies of an agree-
ment that restricts competition in any legitimate respect, let alone one
that inhibits customers from learning about the quality of a dentist's ser-
vice.
Id at 785-86, citing Paramount-Famous Lasky Corp v United States, 282 US 30, 43 (1930)
(stating that agreement among film suppliers to negotiate with distributors according to a
standard form of contract "necessarily and directly tends to destroy" competition); United
States v First National Pictures, Inc, 282 US 44, 54-55 (1930) (invalidating, on the same prin-
ciple, an agreement among distributors with respect to exhibitors).
43 California Dental Association, 526 US at 786 (Breyer dissenting), citing In re Cali-
fornia Dental Association, 121 FTC at 249, 309-11. Justice Breyer also pointed out that
"the Commission looked to the testimony of dentists who themselves had suffered adverse
effects on their business when forced by petitioner to discontinue advertising quality of
COLLABORATION AFTER CALIFORNIA DENTAL
On the question of possible justifications, Justice Breyer noted
that the problem is essentially an "empirical" one of examining
not only whether justifications have been proffered, but also
whether the record supported them. 4 The California Dental As-
sociation had argued that its severe specific restrictions were "in-
extricably tied to a legitimate Association effort to restrict false or
misleading advertising."45 In sum, California Dental Association's
apparent defense was that the only practicable way to reach false
and deceptive advertising was with a broad rule that without in-
dividualized analysis condemned many instances of non-
deceptive advertising as well. Justice Breyer admitted to the
"theoretical plausibility" of this claim but found it unsupported by
the record.46 As for the restraint on quality advertising, the FTC
had noted that the California Dental Association "offered no con-
vincing argument, let alone evidence, that consumers of dental
services have been, or are likely to be, harmed by the broad cate-
gories of advertising it restricts."4' The Ninth Circuit had also
concluded that "the Association's unsubstantiated contention that
'claims about quality are inherently unverifiable and therefore
misleading' could 'justify banning all quality claims without re-
gard to whether they are, in fact, false or misleading.' 48
On this issue, Justice Breyer concluded that:
With one exception, my own review of the record reveals
no significant evidentiary support for the proposition that
the Association's members must agree to ban truthful
price and quality advertising in order to stop untruthful
claims. The one exception is the obvious fact that one can
stop untruthful advertising if one prohibits all advertising.
But since the Association made virtually no effort to sift
care." California Dental Association, 526 US at 786 (Breyer dissenting), citing In re Cali-
fornia Dental Association, 121 FTC at 310-11.
44 California Dental Association, 526 US at 787 (Breyer dissenting).
45 California Dental Association, 526 US at 787 ("The Association, the argument goes,
had to prevent dentists from engaging in the kind of truthful, non-deceptive advertising
that it banned in order effectively to stop dentists from making unverifiable claims about
price or service quality, which claims would mislead the consumer.").
46 Id.
47 Id, quoting In re California Dental Association, 121 FTC at 319-20.
48 California Dental Association, 526 US at 787 (Breyer dissenting), citing California
Dental Association, 128 F3d at 728.
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the false from the true, that fact does not make out a valid
antitrust defense.49
Justice Breyer also found sufficient evidence of market power
in the high percentage of California dentists who were members
of the Association and in the difficulty of entry into dental prac-
tice.5"
Justice Breyer seemed mystified about why the majority
thought the Ninth Circuit's analysis had failed.5" First, he found
statements in the Ninth Circuit's opinion that appeared to ad-
dress and resolve most of the things that the majority believed
were absent from that opinion.52 While the majority found that
the lower court had failed to consider how "the particular restric-
tions on professional advertising could have different effects from
those 'normally' found in the commercial world, even to the point
of promoting competition," Justice Breyer concluded that the
Ninth Circuit had done precisely that. Ordinarily, horizontal
restraints on price advertising unaccompanied by any integration
of production, are unlawful per se.54 But the market complexities
of this particular case had led the Ninth Circuit to apply a "quick
look" rule-of-reason analysis, noting that the "value of restricting
false advertising ... counsels some caution in attacking rules
that purport to do so but merely sweep too broadly."55 Justice
Breyer concluded that "the Court of Appeals, applying ordinary
antitrust principles, reached an unexceptional conclusion."56
Breyer compared the case at bar with FTC v Indiana Federation
of Dentists,57 in which the Court had reached the same "legal con-
clusion" as the Ninth Circuit did in California Dental Associa-
49 California Dental Association, 526 US at 787-88 (Breyer dissenting), citing In re
California Dental Association, 121 FTC at 316-17; NCAA, 468 US at 119; and Areeda,
7 Antitrust Law 1 1505 at 383-84 (cited in note 26).
50 California Dental Association, 526 US at 788-89 (Breyer dissenting).
51 See id at 789 ("But in what way did the Court of Appeals fail? I find the Court's
answers to this question unsatisfactory.").
52 See id at 790-91.
53 See id at 790.
54 See Herbert Hovenkamp, 12 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
Their Application 91 2023b3 at 147-48 (Aspen 1999). See also United States v Gasoline
Retailers Association, 285 F2d 688, 691 (7th Cir 1961) (holding gasoline retailers' limiting
price advertising to the only posting on pump illegal per se); In re Massachusetts Board of
Registration in Optometry, 110 FTC 549, 605 (1988) (holding it unlawful for optometrists'
association to prohibit truthful advertising of pricing or discounts).
55 California Dental Association, 526 US at 790 (Breyer dissenting) (alteration in
original), quoting California Dental Association, 128 F3d at 726-27.
56 California Dental Association, 526 US at 793 (Breyer dissenting).
57 476 US 447, 459 (1986).
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tion.5" In Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Court held that an
agreement among dentists to refuse to give insurers access to cer-
tain medical records violated the rule of reason. Justice Breyer
compared the facts of the two cases, finding no significant differ-
ences between the cases to justify the divergent outcomes.
Finally, as Justice Breyer developed the parties' burden of
persuasion, the government first needed to show what the re-
straint was and that it had the feared potential for adverse ef-
fects on competition. At that point, the burden shifted to the de-
fendant to show a procompetitive justification.59 He added that
the "allocation" of burdens
reflects a gradual evolution within the courts over a period
of many years. That evolution represents an effort care-
fully to blend the procompetitive objectives of the law of
antitrust with administrative necessity. It represents a
considerable advance, both from the days when the Com-
mission had to present and/or refute every possible fact
and theory, and from antitrust theories so abbreviated as
to prevent proper analysis. The former prevented cases
from ever reaching a conclusion, and the latter called forth
the criticism that the "Government always wins." I hope
that this case does not represent an abandonment of that
basic, and important, form of analysis.6 °
II. INFERIOR TRIBUNALS AND THE DUTY TO ELABORATE
The hallmark of good antitrust analysis is reasoned elabora-
tion. First, the antitrust tribunal must explain why a particular
mode of analysis, whether per se or rule of reason, is appropriate
to a certain set of facts. Second, especially in rule-of-reason cases,
the tribunal must also lay out the structural and behavioral fac-
tors upon which its decision is based. Such elaboration is critical
if antitrust decisions are to be useful guides to the future conduct
of others facing Similar circumstances. Decisions that are inade-
quately explained provide little guidance and thus have to be
made over and over again.
58 California Dental Association, 526 US at 793, citing California Dental Association,
128 F3d at 727.
59 See California Dental Association, 526 US at 788 (Breyer dissenting), citing
Areeda, 7 Antitrust Law I 1507b at 397 (cited in note 26); Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law
I 1914c at 313-15 (cited in note 1).
60 California Dental Association, 526 US at 794 (Breyer dissenting) (citations omit-
ted).
1491
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
This Part examines two different problems related to the
duty to elaborate. The first is distinguishing among facial and "as
applied" challenges to a private rule-making association's pub-
lished standards. The second is identifying the tribunal that has
the duty to elaborate.
A. Facial versus "As Applied" Challenges
To a limited extent the majority and dissenting opinions in
California Dental Association appear to rest on different views of
the facts. The majority believed "that the restrictions at issue
here are very far from a total ban on price or discount advertis-
ing."61 Further, the majority seemed to be swayed by the fact that
the restrictions, "at least on their face" were "designed" to pro-
hibit "false or deceptive advertising. "62 Indeed, on their face the
restrictions were broad but certainly could have been interpreted
in a competitive manner. The restrictions defined "false or mis-
leading" claims as
i. ones that are "likely to mislead" because they made only
"partial disclosure of relevant facts;"
ii. those "intended or likely to create false or unjustified ex-
pectations of favorable results and/or costs;" or
iii. those that failed to disclose "all variables and other rele-
vant factors" that might affect a dentist's fee, or that contained
"representations or implications that in reasonable probability
will cause an ordinarily prudent person to misunderstand or be
deceived."63
It is hard to see anything inherently anticompetitive in such
statements. However, other guidelines were more aggressive,
stating that:
[any communication or advertisement which refers to the
cost of dental services shall be exact, without omissions,
and shall make each service clearly identifiable, without
the use of such phrases as "as low as," "and up," "lowest
prices," or words or phrases of similar import.
Any advertisement which refers to the cost of dental
services and uses words of comparison or relativity-for
example, "low fees"--must be based on verifiable data
substantiating the comparison or statement of relativity.
61 California Dental Association, 526 US at 773.
62 Id at 771.
63 Id at 760-61 n 1.
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The burden shall be on the dentist who advertises in such
terms to establish the accuracy of the comparison or
statement of relativity.64
Perhaps the most troublesome was:
Advertising claims as to the quality of services are not
susceptible to measurement or verification; accordingly,
such claims are likely to be false or misleading in any ma-
terial respect. 5
While these guidelines were quite restrictive, on their face they
nevertheless suggested that many instances of price or discount
advertising would in fact be permitted.
But Justice Breyer looked beyond the facial expression of
these "innocent-sounding" rules.66 For him, the "restraint" was
not the text of the rules, but rather the way that they had been
implemented, effectively making discount and quality advertising
of any kind almost impossible." This served to distinguish Cali-
fornia Dental Association from decisions such as National Society
of Professional Engineers v United States,s" where the ethical rule
on its face forbade engineers from engaging in competitive bid-
ding against one another; or from the price-fixing agreement in
Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar,69 where the ethical rule in ques-
tion effectively forbade lawyers from deviating from bar-
established legal fees."°
64 Id at 761.
65 California Dental Association, 526 US at 761 n 1.
66 Id at 782 (Breyer dissenting).
67 See id (citations omitted):
[The] restraints do not include merely the agreement to which [California
Dental Association's] ethical rule literally refers, namely, a promise to re-
frain from advertising that is 'false or misleading in any material re-
spect.'. . . Instead, the Commission found a set of restraints arising out of
the way the Dental Association implemented this innocent-sounding ethi-
cal rule in practice, through advisory opinions, guidelines, enforcement
policies, and review of membership applications.
68 National Society of Professional Engineers v United States, 435 US 679 (1978). The
challenged ethical provision provided that an "[e]ngineer will not compete unfairly with
another engineer by attempting to obtain employment or advancement or professional
engagements by competitive bidding." 435 US at 683 n 3. See also Hovenkamp, 12 Anti-
trust Law 2003h at 56-59 (cited in note 54).
69 Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773, 774 (1975) (holding that state and
county bar associations' minimum-fee schedules violated § 1 of the Sherman Act). See
Hovenkamp, 12 Antitrust Law I 2003g at 54-56 (cited in note 54).
70 Goldfarb, 421 US at 774.
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The biggest difference between a facial and an as-applied
challenge to a professional rule is in the nature of the factual re-
cord. The explicit ban on competitive bidding in Professional En-
gineers presumably could be struck down without any serious
inquiry into implementation. Indeed, even if the ban were rarely
enforced by disciplinary actions, it could still have an in terrorem
effect that would dissuade most engineers from bidding competi-
tively. By contrast, the competitive effects of most of the advertis-
ing restrictions in California Dental Association could not be as-
sessed at all without examining how the restrictions were ap-
plied. On their face most of them appeared quite harmless and
even procompetitive.71
Notwithstanding a detailed FTC record establishing how the
California Dental Association's rules had been enforced in specific
cases, the Ninth Circuit said almost nothing about the issue.
Rather, it simply quoted the rules at length and gave a very brief
summary of how they were enforced.72 The court acknowledged
that
[Ulnlike the situation in [other cases], the California Den-
tal Association's policies do not, on their face, ban truthful,
nondeceptive ads. The allegation instead is that the rules
have been enforced in a way that restricts truthful adver-
tising.73
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's analysis reads much more
like a facial challenge.74 In sum, while the Ninth Circuit's treat-
71 For a description of the California Dental Association's restrictions, see note 67 and
accompanying text.
72 See FTC v California Dental Association, 128 F3d 720, 724-25, 729 (9th Cir 1997).
73 Id at 727 (citations omitted).
74 The Ninth Circuit's only discussion of the issue was this:
The Commission found that through its pattern of enforcement, the Cali-
fornia Dental Association went beyond the literal language of its rules to
prohibit ads that were in fact true and nondeceptive. The California Den-
tal Association's advisory opinions and guidelines indicate that across-
the-board discounts and descriptions of prices as "reasonable" or "low" do
not comply with the Code. Although these guidelines are not directly
binding on member dentists, the Commission staff presented evidence
that the California Dental Association has relied on them in making deci-
sions about members' advertising on appeals from disciplinary decisions
by component societies and on review of membership applications re-
ferred by components. In numerous cases, the California Dental Associa-
tion advised components that advertising did not comply because it in-
cluded "reasonable" or "affordable" language ....
The Commission's opinion cites numerous cases in which the California
Dental Association advised members of objections to special offers, senior
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ment was not purely facial, it did not offer the kind of analysis of
any particular case sufficient to enable the reader to grasp the
entire story. Justice Breyer's summary of the FTC's findings did
that, but according to the Supreme Court majority this was too
late; that duty devolved on the Ninth Circuit itself.75
Suppose (as it actually did occur) a particular dentist had
been expelled from California Dental Association for advertising
"reasonable fees quoted in advance," with no inquiry into whether
the fee quotations themselves or the promise to quote them in
advance had been misleading.76 Or suppose he had been dis-
missed for advertising a one-year guarantee on his work, with no
inquiry into whether he made good on such promises when the
work failed. If such a dentist then challenged that expulsion as a
concerted refusal to deal, a court might readily agree that this
particular instance of rule enforcement was unlawful-not be-
cause the association lacked the authority to make rules forbid-
ding deceptive advertising, but because it applied the rules so as
to condemn something that seems quite clearly in consumers'
best interest, and without searching for actual deception. In such
a case any injunction would presumably run, not against a gen-
eral ethical rule prohibiting "deceptive" price advertising, but
rather against a particular application to conduct not shown to be
deceptive. The FTC record had developed numerous examples of
such overreaching, but the Ninth Circuit ignored them except for
a brief and rather generic mention of all of them together."
citizen discounts, and new patient discounts, apparently without regard
to their truth. It may be that there is some confusion even within the
California Dental Association about the extent to which truthful price
advertising is restricted. But there are enough examples of California
Dental Association objections to truthful ads to find that substantial evi-
dence supports the FTC's conclusion.
In terms of the non-price advertising, advisory opinion eight expressly
states that claims as to the quality of services are inherently likely to be
false or misleading. The evidence before the ALJ demonstrates that the
California Dental Association, following this guideline, has often advised
components that the Code of Ethics bars such claims, without any inquiry
into whether or not, in a particular case, they were true. On numerous
occasions, California Dental Association also informed its components
that guarantees were barred by state law.
Id at 729 (citations omitted).
75 See California Dental Association, 526 US at 779 (assigning to the court of appeals
the "obligation to give a more deliberate look").
76 See id at 783 (Breyer dissenting), quoting In re California Dental Association, 121
FTC at 301.
77 See California Dental Association, 128 F3d at 729.
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B. Who Has the Obligation to Elaborate?
The California Dental Association decision is narrow in two
different senses. First, it divided the Court five to four. Second,
even the majority conceded that further elaboration of the exist-
ing record by the Court of Appeals might be sufficient to support
that court's judgment, given the exhaustive review in the FTC's
decision.7" However, if the FTC's review of the allegations was
adequate, but the Ninth Circuit's review was not, why did not the
Supreme Court simply query whether the agency's own opinion
was sufficient to support its judgment?
A final order from the FTC is reviewed by a federal circuit
court of appeals under two standards. First, findings of fact, in-
cluding "economic" conclusions, are generally reviewed under a
"substantial evidence" standard. The question is whether a rea-
sonable person would accept the record as adequate to support
the stated conclusions of fact.79 By contrast, questions of law are
reviewed de novo, although some deference is given to the FTC's
expertise. 0 The decision whether the rule of reason, the per se
rule, or an intermediate "quick look" is to be applied is a question
of law.8 ' The reviewing court should thus review that decision de
novo.
One of Justice Breyer's objections to the majority was that the
Supreme Court had previously held that the FTC's decision is to
be enforced if the Commission's "factual findings" as supported by
"substantial evidence" are sufficient to "make out a violation of
Sherman Act § 1.8 In that case it would seem that the relevant
question for Supreme Court review was not whether the Ninth
78 See California Dental Association, 526 US at 779.
79 See Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US at 454 (stating that a reviewing court
must accept the Commission's findings of fact if such findings are supported by evidence
that a reasonable mind would find sufficient to support the conclusion); FTC v California
Dental Association, 128 F3d 720, 725 (9th Cir 1997) (same).
80 Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US at 454; California Dental Association, 128
F3d at 725.
81 See Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 US 332, 337 n 3 (1982) (noting
trial court's decision to apply a rule of reason and certify that decision as a question for
interlocutory appeal); FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 US 411, 433
(1990) (noting that once courts have enough experience with a particular kind of restraint,
they apply a conclusive presumption of per se illegality) (citing Maricopa County, 457 US
at 344). See also Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law 1909b at 251-52 (cited in note 1).
82 California Dental Association, 526 US at 783 (Breyer dissenting), quoting Indiana
Federation of Dentists, 476 US at 454-55. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub L No 89-
554, 80 Stat 393 (1966), codified at 5 USC § 706 (1994) ("The reviewing court shall ... (2)
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... (E)
unsupported by substantial evidence.").
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Circuit had listed sufficient facts in its appellate opinion to sup-
port the FTC's judgment, but whether the FTC itself had listed
them. This was apparently Justice Breyer's premise when he
summarized the FTC's evidence, virtually all of which came from
the FTC's own written opinion. He noted that the FTC had before
it "far more" evidence than the Ninth Circuit had actually men-
tioned. 3
One wonders what the result would have been if the Ninth
Circuit had simply issued a summary opinion to the effect that
the FTC's fact findings were amply supported by the record and
its legal conclusions consistent with the law; or had simply said
"review denied." Such opinions are not rarities in appeals from
the final decisions of federal agencies, although they are more
common for some agencies than for others.8 4 The majority's
analysis in California Dental Association suggests the following.
First, California Dental Association should not be read for the
general proposition that the circuit court has a duty to write a
full opinion justifying its own decision where no opinion is neces-
sary. Suppose, for example, that the agency has described the
facts and law correctly and reached its conclusion in a well-
reasoned opinion that the circuit court concludes cannot be im-
proved. Nothing is to be gained by requiring the circuit court to
state any more than its own decision that the facts are amply
supported in the record and the treatment of the law is correct. If
the Supreme Court grants review in such a case, then the sub-
stance of the challenged holding must be gleaned from the
agency's opinion rather than that of the appellate court. Other-
wise, Supreme Court review would consist of nothing more than
an attack on the circuit court's opinion-writing practices, because
nothing of substance is contained in the circuit court opinion. In
sum, the circuit court should be entitled to adopt fully the FTC's
opinion as its own in cases where it has no disagreement. The
83 California Dental Association, 526 US at 783 (Breyer dissenting).
84 Cursory opinions are not common in substantive appeals from final FTC decisions.
But see FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 897 F2d 1168, 1990 WL 27380 (DC Cir)
(resolving, in single paragraph, issue left undecided by Supreme Court); Figgie Intl v FTC,
817 F2d 102, 1987 WL 37227 (4th Cir) (briefly affirming FTC in false advertising case);
Capax v FTC, 607 F2d 493 (DC Cir 1979) (affirming, with one word, FTC false advertising
decision). Abbreviated opinions are much more common in appeals from the final decisions
of other regulatory agencies, particularly the National Labor Relations Board. See, for
example, General Security Services Corp v NLRB, 1999 WL 555301 (8th Cir) (summariz-
ing the holding in one paragraph and stating that "substantial evidence in the record as a
whole" supported the Board's findings and "nothing is to be gained by rehashing the
facts"); Skills Group v NLRB, 185 F3d 862 (3d Cir 1999) ("review denied"). See also Floyd
v FCC, 1999 WL 236879 (DC Cir) (briefly affirming FCC order per curiam).
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Supreme Court always looks at the FTC record for itself when the
circuit court reverses the FTC and the question is whether the
circuit court erred and the FTC record was in fact sufficient to
support its conclusions of law."
Second, in California Dental Association the Ninth Circuit did
not simply affirm the FTC. Rather, it substituted its own judg-
ment about which rule ought to be applied to the price restraints,
indicating a "quick look" rule of reason rather than the per se rule
that the FTC had employed.86 On the nonprice advertising, it
agreed with the FTC and applied an abbreviated rule of reason.87
Further, the Supreme Court disagreed with both lower tribunals,
and insisted not only on a rule-of-reason inquiry for both price-
and nonprice-related advertising, but also on a more elaborate
rule-of-reason inquiry than at least the Ninth Circuit had per-
formed. 8 The Supreme Court then held, in essence, that where
the rule it insisted upon involved a broader inquiry than the rule
that either of the lower tribunals had articulated, it was not the
Supreme Court's job to search the FTC's record or opinion to see
if the evidence supported illegality under this broader inquiry as
well as the disapproved narrower one.89 Once the Supreme Court
decides that both the agency and the circuit court articulated the
wrong rule, the highest Court will not review the agency's deci-
sion simply to see whether the recited facts are also sufficient to
support the outcome under the correct rule.
Congress vested the review of final decisions of administrative
agencies in the courts of appeals.9  While the standard gives a
large amount of control to these intermediate courts, the Su-
preme Court made clear in 1951 that Supreme Court review was
appropriate in the "rare instance when the standard appears to
85 See, for example, In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 107 FTC 562
(1986), vacated in relevant part, 856 F2d 226 (DC Cir 1988), revd in relevant part and
remanded, 493 US 411, 422-23 n 9, 424-28, 431 (1990) (quoting extensively from FTC
findings of fact and disagreeing with Ninth Circuit's factual characterization of respon-
dent's boycott); Indiana Federation of Dentists, 101 FTC 57 (1983), vacated, 745 F2d 1124
(7th Cir 1984), vacatur revd and remanded, 476 US 447, 455-57 (1986) (analyzing in
detail the evidentiary basis for contested FTC findings of fact), affd on remand, 804 F2d
144 (7th Cir 1986).
86 See California Dental Association, 128 F3d at 726-27.
87 See id.
88 California Dental Association, 526 US at 779.
89 Id.
90 See Universal Camera Corp v NLRB, 340 US 474, 491 (1951) ("Whether on the
record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question
which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals.").
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have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied."91 In such cases
the Court-sometimes reinstates the judgment of the agency, as it
did in Indiana Federation of Dentists, after the Seventh Circuit
applied the wrong substantive legal standard.92 In that case,
however, the Court did not simply conclude that the circuit court
erred; it also went back to the FTC opinion and found sufficient
facts to support the FTC's conclusions.93
The unique attribute of California Dental is that the Supreme
Court concluded that both the FTC and the Ninth Circuit had
applied the wrong legal standard. Under the more elaborate rule-
of-reason inquiry that the Supreme Court demanded, the Ninth
Circuit's summary of the facts was insufficient to sustain the
judgment; the FTC's more elaborate compilation of the facts may
have been sufficient, but the Supreme Court would leave it to the
Circuit Courts of Appeals to make that determination. Thus the
Supreme Court's obligation was to correct the errors of the Ninth
Circuit. Once corrected, the Ninth Circuit then applied the cor-
rect standard and analyzed whether the FTC had done its job
properly. 4
91 Universal Camera, 340 US at 491. However, application of the standard is dividing
the Supreme Court. See Allentown Mack Sales and Service v NLRB, 522 US 359 (1998), in
which the majority found that one conclusion of the NLRB was not supported by substan-
tial evidence, notwithstanding appellate court approval. Id at 829. However, Justice
Breyer and three other dissenters (Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg) objected that
the majority should have examined the NLRB's decision itself to determine whether the
inadequacies existed, rather than simply looking at the decision of the circuit court:
[I]f the majority is to overturn a Court of Appeals' "substantial evidence"
decision, it must identify the agency's conclusion, examine the evidence,
and then determine whether the evidence is so obviously inadequate to
support the conclusion that the reviewing court must have seriously mis-
understood the nature of its legal duty.
Allentown Mack, 522 US at 385. Note that Justice Souter dissented with Justice Breyer in
Allentown Mack but wrote for the majority in California Dental Association. The issue is
sufficiently similar to the one in California Dental Association that one wonders whether
Justice Souter has changed his position.
92 Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US at 466 (reversing the judgment of the Court
of Appeals).
93 Id.
94 California Dental Association, 121 FTC 190, 307-22 (1996), affd, 128 F3d 720 (9th
Cir 1997), affd in part and remanded in part, 526 US at 781 (1999), vacated, 2000 WL
1239199, *18 (9th Cir) (remanding the dispute to the FTC with instructions to dismiss its
case against the California Dental Association).
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III. THE RULE OF REASON IN CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION
A. Introduction
The California Dental Association majority's opinion says lit-
tle about how a judge should decide which antitrust rule to apply
to a particular horizontal restraint. Rather, the Court indicates
very generally that the rule to be applied must be "meet for the
case," and that the standard for when to invoke a full blown rule-
of-reason inquiry is the "plausibility of competing claims"95 about
competitive effects.96 These phrases leave several questions open,
such as (1) plausible about what? (2) how plausible? (3) what
kinds of evidence must support a "plausibility" finding at the ini-
tial stage when a court must determine what rule to apply? and
(4) when does a judge engage in this "plausibility" inquiry-is it
the initial inquiry, a later inquiry, or the only inquiry?
While quite unstructured itself, the Supreme Court's opinion
certainly cannot be read as a repudiation of a more structured
approach to antitrust decision making. It simply fails to develop
the logic of such approaches. The Court probably did not mean
that any time a defendant could offer a plausible-sounding argu-
ment that its restraint was "procompetitive" it was entitled to a
full rule-of-reason inquiry examining every possible "competitive"
or "anticompetitive" effect. First, the Supreme Court made clear
that the term "procompetitive" refers to practices that tend to
increase output. 7 Second, speaking of the plausibility of "compet-
ing" claims implies that the plaintiff must make an opening plau-
sible claim that the practice is anticompetitive. If the plaintiff
cannot do that, then no offsetting plausible claim is needed.
Those observations are at least the beginning of a road map for
the rule of reason: first, the plaintiff has the initial burden of al-
leging an anticompetitive restraint-that is, one that tends to
reduce market output. Second, the defendant will then be permit-
ted to offer evidence that the restraint in fact tends to increase
rather than decrease market output, or at least that there is no
significant possibility of an output reduction.
95 California Dental Association, 526 US at 778.
96 Id at 781.
97 See id at 777.
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B. Output Impact of Challenged Restraints
The California Dental Association majority and the dissenters
did not wholly agree about the content of the challenged dental
association restraints. The majority believed that the "output" of
dentists was dental services, not the package of dental-services-
plus-distribution-information that sellers ordinarily provide. The
majority thus rejected as "puzzling" the view adopted in the
Ninth Circuit that the restraints on advertising were a form of
output limitation.9" The Supreme Court majority concluded that:
If quality advertising actually induces some patients to ob-
tain more care than they would in its absence, then re-
stricting such advertising would reduce the demand for
dental services, not the supply; and ... the producers'
supply... is normally relevant in determining whether a
... limitation has the anticompetitive effect of artificially
raising prices.99
Justice Breyer had a different view:
[Ihf the Court means this statement as an argument
against the anticompetitive tendencies that flow from an
agreement not to advertise service quality, I believe it is
the majority, and not the Court of Appeals, that is mis-
taken. An agreement not to advertise, say, "gentle care" is
anticompetitive because it imposes an artificial barrier
against each dentist's independent decision to advertise
gentle care. That barrier, in turn, tends to inhibit those
dentists who want to supply gentle care from getting to-
gether with those customers who want to buy gentle care.
... There is adequate reason to believe that tendency pre-
sent in this case.100
Consider an agreement among automobile manufacturers to
install cheaper carburetors as fuel distributors rather than more
expensive fuel injection systems, while making no provision to
reduce the number of cars. The majority's reasoning requires the
conclusion that such an agreement would not be an output reduc-
98 Id at 776.
99 California Dental Association, 526 US at 776-77.
100 Id at 791 (Breyer dissenting), citing Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 1505' at 404
(Aspen Supp 1998).
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tion, for it would reduce the demand for cars (to the extent pur-
chasers preferred fuel injectors) without affecting the supply. The
Court evidently presumed a static market in which the automo-
bile manufacturers would respond to the reduced demand by low-
ering their prices.
But the more likely explanation of such an agreement is that
the automobile manufacturers wish to reduce innovation-based
competition with one another. The majority apparently had in
mind a form of quality advertising whose purpose was to inform
(or misinform) patients about the high quality of dental services
generally. For example, dental association advertising about the
high quality of dental care in California might serve to give Cali-
fornia residents more confidence about going to the dentist, thus
increasing the demand for dental services. By contrast, a restric-
tion on such information would reduce the demand for such ser-
vices, and thus serve to lower prices.
In contrast, Justice Breyer described the use of quality adver-
tising as a competitive device for distinguishing one dentist from
another. That is, Dr. Brown might advertise "gentle care" in order
to induce more customers to visit her rather than a different den-
tist.' Competitive advertising of quality in this fashion might
serve to increase the demand for dental services generally, but as
Justice Breyer noted, it would also serve to steer patients desir-
ing gentle care to Dr. Brown and thus away from other den-
tists."2 As a result, the latter would have to communicate their
own offering of gentle care (or some other attribute that custom-
ers might desire).
The record in the case indicated that the advertising at which
the California Dental Association restrictions were directed was
of the competitive type that served to distinguish one dentist
from another, not the more general advertising that might be
promulgated by the Association itself to increase consumer confi-
dence in dentistry. Indeed, if the anticipated impact of quality
advertising was to give customers more confidence in dentists
generally rather than more trade to the advertising dentist, then




103 That is, there would be a significant free rider problem. For example, farmer Brown
is not likely to advertise the healthful effects of potatoes if the anticipated result is that
customers will buy potatoes generally-from Brown's many thousand competitors as well
as Brown herself. She would endure all of the expense but obtain only a small portion of
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To be sure, the majority was correct that restraints on one
part of a price-service package might serve to increase the num-
ber of units sold in another part of the package, at least in the
short run. For example, if all the breakfast cereal manufacturers
agreed to stop advertising they might be able to reduce their costs
by as much as 20 percent. If these cost reductions were passed on,
the result might be greater cereal sales. Or if a group of automo-
bile dealers agree to close their showrooms on evenings and Sun-
days the result might be lower overhead costs, lower car prices
and conceivably increased car sales."4 But should a court apply
the rule of reason because of such possibilities?... Any agreement
eliminating or reducing a significant input can lessen production
costs, whether the input be a physical component,1 6 advertising,
or research and development. For example, rivals facing heavy
innovation budgets might agree with each other to cease innovat-
ing and thus to reduce their costs, resulting in lower prices. In-
deed, even a naked bid-rigging agreement can reduce the sub-
stantial cost of computing competitive bids." '
Ordinarily a naked horizontal restraint is not saved from per
se condemnation simply because it offers the possibility of higher
output of the narrowly defined product itself.0 8 The "output" of
the benefit. Such advertising would ordinarily be promulgated by a potato growers' asso-
ciation and the expenses divided via association dues. Brown herself would advertise only
in a way that distinguished her potatoes from those of rivals.
104 See, for example, In re Detroit Auto Dealers Association, Inc, 111 FTC 417, 499 n 24
(1989) ("We observe ... that prices may effectively have risen above competitive levels if
they simply remained the same after agreement. Holding all other factors constant, we
would expect car prices to have gone down in response to dealers' overhead costs."), affd
955 F2d 457 (6th Cir 1991). Compare NCAA v Board of Regents of University of Okla-
homa, 468 US 85, 116-17 (1984) (correctly, in this author's opinion, rejecting the proposi-
tion that restrictions on the number of televised football games served to increase the
demand for gate attendance). Of course, any successful cartel serves to increase the de-
mand for substitute products not covered by the cartel agreement.
105 The Sixth Circuit thought so. See Detroit Auto Dealers Association, 955 F2d at 472
("We do not equate limitation of hours with price-fixing, but we do not find error in the
Commission's conclusion that hours of operation in this business is a means of competi-
tion, and that such limitation may be an unreasonable restraint of trade."). See Areeda,
7 Antitrust Law 1511 (cited in note 26).
106 National Macaroni Manufacturers Association, 65 FTC 583, 584 (1964), affd 345
F2d 421, 422 (7th Cir 1965) (condemning agreement among pasta makers to reduce the
quality of macaroni by substituting 50 percent inferior farina wheat instead of following
the higher quality standard of 100 percent durum semolina). See Herbert Hovenkamp,
13 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 2136 at
193-94 (Aspen 1999).
107 Compare FTC v Alliant Techsystems, 808 F Supp 9, 21 (D DC 1992) (rejecting ar-
gument that eliminating the cost of competitive bidding is an efficiency justifying the
merger of two defense contractors). See also Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law I 1907c at
221-25 (cited in note 1).
108 See, for example, National Macaroni, 345 F2d at 421.
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any firm is the combination of product-plus-other-services that
the market produces.1"9 Thus the output of the car dealer is car
transactions, its desirable showroom and hours of operation, and
its advertising. An agreement among dealers not to have show-
rooms reduces costs and may or may not result in greater cars
sales. But we attach significance to the fact that consumers value
the showroom; otherwise a well-functioning competitive market
would not have produced it.
By contrast, a properly restricted agreement not to engage in
fraudulent behavior is not conducive to reduced output in either
the short or the long run.11° In a well-functioning market, compe-
tition tends to reduce the instances of fraud, but in a poorly func-
tioning one, those tendencies may be suppressed. In sum, there is
a consumer interest in suppressing misleading or false informa-
tion, but hardly in suppressing all information without regard to
deception or falsity.
C. Which Markets? Greater Deference to the
Learned Professions?
The California Dental Association majority opinion narrows
the range of horizontal actions that can be subjected to a "quick
look." It may even signal a return to an era in which the so-called
"learned professions""' were given deference that has been de-
nied to them in recent years. In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court
stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as dis-
tinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in de-
termining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice
of professions as interchangeable with other business ac-
tivities, and automatically to apply to the professions anti-
trust concepts which originated in other areas. The public
service aspect, and other features of the professions, may
require that a particular practice, which could properly be
109 See Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law T 1901d at 186-89 (cited in note 1); Hovenkamp,
12 Antitrust Law 9I 2023b at 144-45 (cited in note 54).
110 However, the Supreme Court briefly suggested the possibility that deceptive adver-
tising might indefinitely attract additional customers, precisely because they were misled.
California Dental Association, 526 US at 775.
111 Basically, doctors, dentists, engineers, lawyers, and optometrists comprise the
learned professions. See Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law 9 1911e at 280-82 (cited in note 1).
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viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another con-
text, be treated differently.'12
And in Engineers the Supreme Court acknowledged that:
by their nature, professional services may differ signifi-
cantly from other business services, and, accordingly, the
nature of the competition in such services may vary. Ethi-
cal norms may serve to regulate and promote this competi-
tion, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason.
1 3
Significantly, these decisions ended up condemning the restraint,
notwithstanding the deferential language. Later decisions appear
to abandon deferential treatment altogether.14
While the California Dental Association opinion quoted the
entire Goldfarb passage stated above,115 the context was not a
discussion of special treatment for the learned professions as
such, but rather of restraints in markets that are "characterized
by striking disparities between the information available" to the
seller and the buyer.1 However, the Court then added the previ-
ously quoted statement to the effect that advertising in profes-
sional markets is rare, and comparing services is very difficult,
and that "the difficulty for customers or potential competitors to
get and verify information about the price and availability of ser-
vices magnifies the dangers to competition associated with mis-
leading advertising."117 Further, the quality of professional ser-
vices resists "calibration," in part "because of the specialized
knowledge required to evaluate the services," and in part "be-
cause of the difficulty in determining whether, and the degree to
which, an outcome is attributable to the quality of services.., or
to something else."118
112 Goldfarb, 421 US at 788 n 17.
113 National Society of Professional Engineers, 435 US at 696. See also Indiana Federa-
tion of Dentists, 476 US at 458 (perhaps conduct in question would be evaluated under per
se rule in ordinary market, but Court traditionally reluctant to apply per se rule to
agreements involving the learned professions).
114 See, for example, FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 US 411,
435-36 (1990) (applying per se rule to naked boycott by lawyers refusing to defend indi-
gent criminals without a pay increase); Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 457
US 332, 348 (1982) (applying per se rule to maximum price fixing by physicians).
115 See California Dental Association, 526 US at 771-72 n 10.
116 Id at 773.
117 Id.
118 Id at 772 (citations omitted).
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Thus the context indicates that the Supreme Court was not
intending to defer to the learned professions as such, but rather
to distinguish a class of differentiated markets having unusually
high information costs from the more general run of markets.
This special class of markets could be either broader or narrower
than the learned professions. For example, it could be broader if
there were other markets, say for particularly complex technol-
ogy, where the same considerations apply. It also could be nar-
rower in situations that involved the learned professions, but
where these considerations were thought not to apply, or to apply
only in a more attenuated fashion. For example, the information
disparity between medical sellers and buyers is very high when
the relevant buyer is the consumer herself, as was assumed in
California Dental Association. But it is not as high when the
relevant buyer is a knowledgeable professional, such as a man-
aged care administrator or insurance company. Thus relatively
harsher treatment might be justified in a case like Indiana Fed-
eration of Dentists,"9 where the relevant purchaser was a health
insurer.12 ° Under California Dental Association, a court facing a
horizontal restraint that riight seem to be naked in the usual
case must therefore ask an additional question-not whether the
restraint involves the learned professions but rather whether it
involves a situation with an unusually high disparity of informa-
tion between sellers and buyers, and unusual difficulties in as-
sessing quality or price claims.
Positive answers to this question presumably are uncommon.
The California Dental Association Supreme Court majority ap-
parently found a plausible claim that imperfections in the dental
services market rise nearly to the level of "market failure"-
situations where the unrestrained market is simply not doing an
adequate job of providing the correct quality or price of the ser-
vices in question. 2' A conclusion that the California Dental Asso-
ciation restraints were procompetitive is tantamount to an infer-
ence that the unrestrained market would produce misinforma-
tion, in the form of false or misleading advertising,
119 Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US at 447.
120 Justice Breyer found it very difficult to reconcile Indiana Federation of Dentists
with California Dental Association, see California Dental Association, 526 US at 793
(Breyer dissenting), but the fact that in the former case the relevant buyers were insurers
may be a significant distinction.
121 A narrower definition of "market failure" would encompass only those situations
where the failure can be corrected by government, as opposed to private, intervention.
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that would make consumers worse off, which in turn assumes
that the customers are unable to fend for themselves.
Concluding that some markets are prone to produce misin-
formation too readily undermines the basic economic principle
that market competition is a useful way of providing goods to cus-
tomers. Assuming that the California Dental Association re-
straints effectively eliminated price and quality advertising
among California dentists, a rule permitting these restrictions
could relegate consumers to highly inferior methods of determin-
ing price and quality. They would still have word of mouth, which
is likely to be significantly more haphazard and significantly less
reliable. They could still try out a dentist and then abandon him
if either price or quality seemed unsatisfactory; however, they
would be unsure whether a different dentist would be better or
worse.
In any event, it would be a serious error to apply the rule of
California Dental Association in markets where such claims of
market complexity are less obvious. For example, if a group of
gasoline retailers122 or automobile dealers 23 makes an agreement
eliminating or restricting price advertising or quality claims, the
rule of California Dental Association would presumably not ap-
ply.
One likely and unfortunate effect of California Dental Asso-
ciation will be a debate played out through litigation about when
horizontal agreements restraining advertising are appropriate in
markets exhibiting any degree of information disparity or other
complexity. For example, suppose that the members of a hospi-
tal24 or pharmaceutical association 25 agree to refrain from adver-
tising. These markets exhibit at least some of the complexities
that the market for dental services exhibits. But in the great ma-
jority of cases application of California Dental Association would
result in expensive and needless inquiries into power and anti-
competitive effects. In any event, the decision is properly limited
122 See, for example, United States v Gasoline Retailers Association, 285 F2d 688, 691
(7th Cir 1961) (finding it a per se unlawful and criminal offense for gasoline retailers to
agree not to advertise their gasoline prices except by posting them directly on the pump).
123 In re Arizona Automobile Dealers Association, 59 Fed Reg 34442 (FTC 1994) (pro-
hibiting, by consent decree, agreements not to advertise).
124 See, for example, United States v Greater Des Moines Hospital Association, 1993
WL 113410, *1 (S D Iowa) (consent decree banning restrictions on hospital advertising).
125 United States v American Pharmaceutical Association, 1981-2 Trade Cas 64168
(W D Mich 1981) (approving consent decree forbidding pharmacists from agreeing to re-
strain price advertising of prescription drugs, "other than false and misleading advertis-
ing").
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to restraints on advertising, not to price-fixing itself.'26 Further, it
can be applied sensibly only to the majority's characterization of
the facts, which found the restraints in question to be "very far"
from a complete ban on advertising,127 but perhaps no more than
an attempt to control deception.
Nevertheless, a likely consequence of California Dental Asso-
ciation is that many defendants in horizontal agreement cases
will cite the majority opinion defensively. The courts will then
have the expensive job of sorting out those markets in which con-
sumer information costs are sufficiently high to warrant the de-
fense and those in which they are not. For example, is a full rule-
of-reason inquiry necessary for equivalent restraints in automo-
bile sales or repair-an area that was the subject of one article
that the Court cited? l2 ' If so, then why not the markets for appli-
ance repair, custom home construction, or plumbing? Each of
these plus many others involve significant disparities in the in-
formation available to buyers and sellers, price and service com-
binations that are readily capable of manipulation, and other
market failures comparable to those found in the markets for
dental or medical services. There is no obvious reason why an
agreement among automobile mechanics not to advertise dis-
counts or warranties should be treated any differently than an
agreement among dentists to do the same thing.
Further, the Supreme Court may have concluded too readily
that someone with "even a rudimentary understanding of eco-
nomics"12 9 could readily distinguish the relatively ambiguous
dangers of the dentists' collective refusal to provide x-rays in In-
diana Federation of Dentists from the restraints on advertising in
California Dental Association. In the earlier case, the dentists
had argued that a far-away claim examiner relying only on x-rays
and patient records could not make a fully informed judgment
about the proper course of treatment. 3 ° If that were true, then
126 But see Granite Partners, LP v Bear, Stearns & Co, 58 F Supp 2d 228, 238 (S D NY
1999) (holding that California Dental Association requires a full rule-of-reason treatment
for an alleged agreement among brokers to rig bids and engage in sham bidding to keep
prices at below-market levels). The market may have been complex, but that in itself is
insufficient to justify rule-of-reason treatment for an agreement with the acknowledged
purpose of suppressing prices.
127 California Dental Association, 526 US at 773 ("[T]he restrictions at issue here are
very far from a total ban on price or discount advertising.").
128 See Akerlof, 84 Q J Econ at 489-92 (cited in note 24) (analyzing information asym-
metries in the used car market).
129 California Dental Association, 526 US at 771.
130 See Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US at 464-65.
178 [2000:
COLLABORATION AFTER CALIFORNIA DENTAL
denial of x-rays might have led to increased payment of claims for
proper dental care, and this in turn would amount to an increase
in the output of dental services. The more plausible difference
between the two cases is that the relevant purchaser in Indiana
Federation of Dentists was an insurer. In California Dental Asso-
ciation, the relevant purchaser was not specified but was pre-
sumably the patients themselves.'31
D. Naked Restraints
Nothing in the California Dental Association opinion requires
a rule-of-reason analysis for clearly naked restraints. A restraint
is naked if it is formed with the objectively intended purpose or
likely effect of increasing price or decreasing output.'32 By con-
trast, a restraint is ancillary if its objectively intended purpose or
likely effect is lower prices or increased output, measured by
quantity or quality.'33 Under this definition a naked restraint is a
rational act only if the actors collectively have sufficient power to
affect output and price marketwide. By contrast, an ancillary re-
straint can be profitable, and thus rational, whether or not the
participants collectively control the market.
The premise of the California Dental Association majority's
insistence on a rule of reason was that it was unclear whether the
challenged restraints on advertising increased, reduced or had no
effect on the output of dental services.' The Court took some
pains to distinguish cases such as Professional Engineers... and
NCAA v Board of Regents,'36 which involved agreements that were
rational only on the premise that the defendants collectively had
the power to reduce market-wide output. It also distinguished
Indiana Federation of Dentists, where the agreement to withhold
x-rays was rational only on the premise that dental patients and
131 Neither the Supreme Court's nor the Ninth Circuit's California Dental Association
opinions ever discussed the role of insurers, and even the FTC's opinion barely mentioned
it.
132 See Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law I 1906a at 210-12 (cited in note 1).
133 See Polk Brothers v Forest City Enterprises, 776 F2d 185, 190 (7th Cir 1985) ("The
reason for distinguishing between "ancillary" and "naked" restraints is to determine
whether the agreement is part of a cooperative venture with prospects for increasing out-
put. If it is, it should not be condemned per se.").
134 California Dental Association, 526 US at 771 ("[I]t seems to us that the California
Dental Association's advertising restrictions might plausibly be thought to have a net
procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition.").
135 Professional Engineers, 435 US 679.
136 NCAA v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (1984).
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insurers could not find a sufficient supply of compliant dentists. 137
In such cases, the proffered defense attempts to justify a market-
wide output decrease rather than show why such a decrease has
not or is not likely to occur. In sum, no matter how complex the
market, California Dental Association does not mandate rule-of-
reason treatment for restraints whose logic depends on the exer-
cise of market power.
Suppose that California Dental Association were a small and
relatively powerless association of California dentists, perhaps
equivalent to the National Lawyers Guild rather than the ABA.
In that case an advertising restraint designed to limit informa-
tion that a competitive market would ordinarily provide would
not succeed. Dental patients would respond to the restraints by
seeking out non-member dentists who did advertise price and
quality. By contrast, if the only impact of the restraints were to
increase consumer confidence in California Dental Association
dentists, then the restrictions would be profitable to member den-
tists whether or not they had market power. For example, even a
tiny group of Chicago pediatricians or auto mechanics could profit
by giving truthful quality guarantees or price assurances that
other pediatricians or mechanics did not offer. But they could
profit by suppressing such information or guarantees only if they
controlled the market. Thus the all-important question in Cali-
fornia Dental Association was "Would the California Dental Asso-
ciation restraints (as applied) have been profitable to its members
even if the California Dental Association lacked any market
power whatsoever?" For example, suppose that the California
Dental Association represented only a small percentage of Cali-
fornia dentists, and that its rules effectively forbade members
from making any advertising claims about price or quality. By
contrast, the majority of dentists faced no such restrictions and
advertised both price and quality freely. One suspects that the
result would be increased sales by the advertising dentists at the
expense of the non-advertising dentists. If that is true, then the
California Dental Association restraint was naked and should not
have been given rule-of-reason treatment.
137 California Dental Association, 526 US at 770, citing Indiana Federation of Dentists,
476 US at 464-65.
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E. Justifications
1. The troublesome problem of market imperfections.
Once the plaintiff has shown a restraint with significant an-
ticompetitive potential, the defendant may defend the restraint
by showing that it is procompetitive in fact. In California Dental
Association, the Association argued that significant disparities in
information between suppliers and consumers operated to make
the advertising restrictions procompetitive, or at least competi-
tively harmless.
One disturbing feature of this argument is that the very in-
formation failures that the Supreme Court described as indicat-
ing more elaborate examination under the rule of reason also
make the market in question more prone to collusion. For this
reason, antitrust law has traditionally and properly been hostile
toward competitor agreements restraining advertising. The less
information a consumer has about relative price and quality, the
easier it is for the market participants to charge supra-
competitive prices, provide inferior quality, or avoid innovation.'38
Indeed, when consumer information is very poor, one can have a
"competitively structured" market with numerous service provid-
ers but still have noncompetitive pricing.'39 The consumer tends
not to know whether the dentist he has selected is offering com-
petitive price and quality, but once the commitment is made, the
cost of switching to a different dentist can be high and the con-
sumer cannot readily gauge whether the switch will make him
better or worse off. This is the same rationale that justified con-
demnation of the ban on competitive bidding in Professional En-
gineers.4 ° The effect of the ban was to delay the communication of
usable price information until after the consumer had selected an
engineer, at a time when switching costs would be much higher.''
138 See Hovenkamp, 12 Antitrust Law 2021c at 125-29, 2023b at 144-54 (cited in
note 54). See also Mardirosian v American Institute of Architects, 474 F Supp 628, 636-37
(D DC 1979) (granting plaintiff partial summary judgment against AIA ethical rule for-
bidding an architect from trying to compete for the business of another architect who had
already been "selected" for the job).
139 See George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J Pol Econ 213, 219 (1961)
(demonstrating that "search" or attainment of greater information by buyer is necessary to
reduce dispersion in prices).
140 435 US at 694-96.
141 See Hovenkamp, 12 Antitrust Law I 2022e at 140-44 (cited in note 54) (arguing
that the agreement in Professional Engineers eliminating competitive bidding increased
consumers' search costs, making comparison shopping more difficult, and potentially
leading consumers to pay super-competitive prices).
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Such markets are ordinarily improved by more rather than less
price and quality information, for the information enables the
consumer to make comparisons before he or she selects a particu-
lar provider.
For that reason, assuming that the rules articulated by the
California Dental Association are reasonable on their face, the
tribunal must pay close attention to how they are applied. It is
one thing to condemn "false and misleading" advertising and
have a dispute resolution process devoted to identifying such ad-
vertising. It is a very different thing to condemn practically all
price and quality advertising under such a rule, with little or no
attempt to distinguish that which is false and misleading. The
result of such a program largely eliminates the consumer's power
to make pre-selection comparisons, except by greatly inferior
modes of communication.
2. Less restrictive alternatives: consumer participation.
In a rule-of-reason case, once power and a significant poten-
tial for anticompetitive effects are shown, the defendant may an-
swer by showing a significant procompetitive benefit.' At that
point, the plaintiff can rebut by showing that the same or sub-
stantially similar benefits could be achieved in a less restrictive
manner-that is, by some means that impose a lesser threat to
competition.14
The California Dental Association rules were stated in a
manner that seemed to make them reasonable. For the most part,
their anticompetitive effect lay in the way they were enforced. As
Justice Breyer noted, the definition of the restraint must encom-
pass not merely the text of the challenged rules, but also their
enforcement history.'44 In that case, one could either say that the
142 Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law I 1914c at 313-15 (cited in note 1). See also United
States v Brown University, 5 F3d 658, 669 (3d Cir 1993) (holding that the burden shifts to
the defendant once the plaintiff meets the "initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of
market power or actual anticompetitive effects"); Law v NCAA, 902 F Supp 1394, 1404 (D
Kan 1995), affd 134 F3d 1010 (10th Cir 1998) (holding that in a rule-of-reason inquiry, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the challenged conduct has a procompetitive
justification).
143 See Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law 1913 at 303-10 (cited in note 1). See also Capi.
tal Imaging Associates, PC v Mohawk Valley Medical Associates, Inc, 996 F2d 537, 543 (2d
Cir 1993) (stating that once defendant has offered evidence that its combination has pro-
competitive "redeeming virtues," the burden shifts back to the plaintiff "to demonstrate
that any legitimate collaborative objectives proffered by the defendant could have been
achieved by less restrictive alternatives").
144 See California Dental Association, 526 US at 783 (Breyer dissenting).
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restraint, properly defined, was much too broad and thus was
facially unreasonable. Or else one might say that there clearly is
a less restrictive alternative-namely, application of the rules in
such a way as to separate bona fide instances of deceptive adver-
tising from the majority of advertising claims that are competi-
tive.
The dental services market described in California Dental
Association appropriately suggests two things: first, significant
complexities made consumers particularly vulnerable to mislead-
ing advertising claims; but second, the same complexities created
a significant potential for dentists to mask themselves from com-
petition by restricting the flow of useful consumer information.
This in turn suggests, first, that some restrictions on dentists'
advertising are in order and second, that the restrictions should
not be managed exclusively by the dentists themselves.
Advertising restrictions promulgated as rules of professional
ethics are in fact a form of standard setting, and inquiries into
the competitiveness of standard-setting programs often involve a
structural element. Standard setting is most likely to be anti-
competitive when sellers alone set the standards. Conversely, our
concerns about anticompetitive standard setting are alleviated
considerably when those setting the standards include consumers
and other vertically related firms.145 As the Supreme Court ob-
served, the typical dental patient may be quite uninformed about
dental care. But the industry as a whole is full of consumer rep-
resentatives who are both professional and well-informed.
For example, suppose that a private organization passing
judgment on dentists' advertising had equal representation of
dentists, insurers and other managers of health plans, and con-
sumer-interest groups. Insurers and consumers have a real inter-
est in ridding a profession of deceptive advertising, but they also
have an interest in seeing that procompetitive advertising is un-
restrained. Dental work that is of high quality, that is guaran-
teed, or that is sold at low prices benefits consumers and health
care managers alike. In the general area of standard setting, case
145 See Hovenkamp, 13 Antitrust Law 2232a at 353-54, 2232d at 358-61 (cited in
note 106). Compare Allied Tube and Conduit Corp v Indian Head, 486 US 492, 509 (1988)
(striking down private association's vote to exempt pipe made of alternative materials
from its safety standard because the association members had economic incentives that
biased the process), with M & H Tire Co v Hoosier Racing Tire Corp, 733 F2d 973, 980 (1st
Cir 1984) (finding no violation where auto racing association, with no interest in tire pro-
duction, approved a single tire design and manufacturer for each season and forbade other
tires on the association's tracks, reasoning that track owners making up association have
no financial interest in tire production).
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after case has observed that standard setting is unlikely to have
anticompetitive effects when the relevant decision makers are not
competitors producing the product or service that was evalu-
ated.14 Once a significant potential for anticompetitive effects is
clear-as it certainly was in this case-an antitrust tribunal
could rightfully insist that challenged instances of dental adver-
tising be individually evaluated, and that the tribunal doing the
evaluating not be controlled by the dentists themselves.
IV. INDEFENSIBLE JUXTAPOSITION IN LAW
OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Horizontal restraints should and do receive the most severe
scrutiny in antitrust analysis.147 They pose the greatest possibil-
ity to threaten competitive harm-threats that are quite appar-
ent in this particular case. Although differences in Court person-
nel undoubtedly provide the best explanation, the California Den-
tal Association decision makes the Supreme Court appear quite
sanguine about agreements among competitors with a significant
anticompetitive potential, while having exaggerated concerns
about unilateral conduct of supposedly dominant firms. In both
Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp 148 and Eastman
146 See Hovenkamp, 13 Antitrust Law 2232d at 358-61 (cited in note 106). See, for
example, Moore v Boating Industrial Association, 819 F2d 693, 696 (7th Cir 1987) (approv-
ing restriction on submersible tail lights for boat trailers when association was made up
largely of trailer manufacturers, who were thus purchasers of the lights rather than plain-
tiffs competitors in manufacturing them); ECOS Electronics Corp v Underwriters Labora-
tories, 743 F2d 498, 500 (7th Cir 1984) (holding that laboratories' approval of the product
of plaintiffs rival constituted an illegal restraint on trade since the laboratory was an
independent organization and none of its managers "may be associated with a manufac-
turer or vendor of products investigated by [the laboratory]"); United States Trotting Asso-
ciation v Chicago Downs Association, Inc, 665 F2d 781, 787-90 (7th Cir 1981) (approving
restrictive trotting association limitation on race tracks where most of those involved in
making the rule were not race track operators); Jessup v American Kennel Club, Inc, 61 F
Supp 2d 5, 11 (S D NY 1999) (holding that a kennel club did not violate the Sherman Act
by adopting a height standard that tended to exclude the plaintiffs' English-bred Labrador
Retrievers since the club did not have a financial interest in breeding dogs).
147 See NCAA, 468 US at 99-100 ('A [horizontal] restraint ... has often been held to
be unreasonable as a matter of law . . . . [H]orizontal price fixing [is] perhaps the para-
digm of an unreasonable restraint of trade."); Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law 1902 at
190-99 (cited in note 1). See also Continental TV, Inc v GTE Sylvania, Inc, 433 US 36, 58
n 28 (1977) ('There is no doubt that [horizontal] restrictions... would be illegal per se, but
we do not regard the problems of proof as sufficiently great to justify a per se rule.") (cita-
tions omitted).
148 Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585, 610 (1985) (holding
that the unilateral decision by the owner of a skiing facility to terminate an arrangement
to offer all-mountain pass in cooperation with owner of competing facility could give rise to
antitrust liability).
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Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, the Court was quick to
find anticompetitive consequences in unilateral refusals to deal-
acts that are rarely anticompetitive and where the remedy of
forced dealing is usually worse than the problem to be fixed. 5 °
Kodak also permitted a finding of substantial market power on a
highly controversial "lock-in" theory15' that has produced much
litigation and forced the lower courts to distinguish Kodak at
every opportunity. 5 ' The result is a body of antitrust rules which
makes it far too difficult to litigate against collaborative activity
where the threat of consumer harm is significant, and far too
easy to litigate against manufacturing firms that have significant
after-markets,'53 even where competition is almost certain to dis-
cipline most significant opportunistic behavior. 5 4
But the basic principles should be clear: substantial market
power by dominant firms is relatively uncommon and resisted by
competitors. Only a few unilateral acts are clearly anticompeti-
tive, and the courts are not good at correcting the problems
caused by unilateral refusals to deal. In sharp contrast, competi-
tor collaboration can yield market power quickly, and when most
of a market's competitors act in concert they have considerable
149 Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, 504 US 451, 482-86 (1992) (finding
possible anticompetitive consequences resulting from Kodak's decision to tie service for its
machines to the sale of its parts).
150 See Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, 3A Antitrust Law: An Analysis of
Antitrust Principles and Their Application [ 765 at 99-104, 771b-c at 174-77 (Little,
Brown 1996).
151 Lock-in theory states that once a consumer has invested a considerable amount of
money in a piece of hi-tech equipment, the customer will not easily change to a new brand
of equipment. Such customers will tolerate substantial increases in service price before
switching brands. Lock-in theory therefore allows the court to define the relevant market
as a single manufacturer's brand of equipment. See Phillip E. Areeda, Einer Elhauge, and
Herbert Hovenkamp, 10 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their
Application I 1740c at 144-45 (Little, Brown 1996).
152 See America Online, Inc v Great Deals.Net, 49 F Supp 2d 851, 858 (E D Va 1999)
("[lit is improper to define a market simply by identifying a group of consumers who have
purchased a given product ... . This is not a case like Eastman Kodak where a single
brand of product or service constitutes a relevant market because it is unique. In this case,
there are other e-mail services that provide the same type of service as AOL. Defendants
could have advertised through another e-mail service and still reached the Internet-
accessing public."); Chawla v Shell Oil Co, 75 F Supp 2d 626, 639 (S D Tex 1999) (holding
Kodak is not applicable where the "lock-in" effect arises from negotiated contractual obli-
gations). See also Areeda, Elhauge and Hovenkamp, 10 Antitrust Law 1740 at 137-77
(cited in note 151).
153 An after-market is a market for parts, services or supplies for a durable primary
product. For example, the purchaser of a Kodak photocopier can ordinarily anticipate that
she will have to purchase parts, service or supplies over the life of the machine.
154 See, for example, Red Lion Medical Safety v Ohmeda, 63 F Supp 2d 1218, 1230-31
(E D Cal 1999) (extending Kodak to a situation where the defendant had not changed its
parts policy after a large number of consumers were locked in to its primary equipment).
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power to produce noncompetitive results. Further, the courts are
much better at administering decrees against competitor collabo-
ration than those against unilateral acts.'55 The law of unilateral
refusals to deal, and particularly the Supreme Court's willingness
to permit substantial market power to be inferred from the "lock-
in" imposed on customers of non-dominant sellers, is thus due for
re-examination.
V. POWER
A full rule-of-reason inquiry requires a rather elaborate con-
sideration of market power. While the Supreme Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit's application of a "quick look" to the dental as-
sociation facts, it also made clear that the final inquiry in this
particular case need not involve a full inquiry of the kind that
might be necessary in, say, a monopolization case. The Court
said:
Saying here that the Court of Appeals's conclusion at least
required a more extended examination of the possible fac-
tual underpinnings than it received is not, of course, nec-
essarily to call for the fullest market analysis. Although
we have said that a challenge to a "naked restraint on
price and output" need not be supported by "a detailed
market analysis" in order to "requir[e] some competitive
justification," it does not follow that every case attacking a
less obviously anticompetitive restraint (like this one) is a
candidate for plenary market examination. The truth is
that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are
less fixed than terms like "per se," "quick look," and "rule-
of-reason" tend to make them appear .... "[Wihether the
ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual
market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same-
whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competi-
tion."'56
155 Compare Image Technical Services v Eastman Kodak, 125 F3d 1195, 1225-26 (9th
Cir 1997) (interpreting injunction against Kodak so injunction would not lead to anticom-
petitive effects by making Kodak the only parts supplier to its own competitors), with
NCAA, 468 US at 120 (invalidating organization's restrictions on televised athletic con-
tests). See Hovenkamp, 11 Antitrust Law 1903 at 199-202 (cited in note 1).
156 California Dental Association, 526 US at 779 (citation omitted and alteration in
original).
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Thus the Court would apparently permit the more truncated
power inquiry similar to the one in NCAA or Indiana Federation
of Dentists. Indeed, no power inquiry at all seems to be necessary
in a case such as this one where the restraints as applied are
prima facie anticompetitive and less restrictive alternatives-in
the form of more accurate and individualized determinations of
what is false or misleading-seem readily available.
Beyond the highly general quoted statement, the Supreme
Court majority never addressed the market power requirement,
except to state that the FTC and the Ninth Circuit found it met,
and thus apparently agreed with the tribunals below that power
was adequate.157 Justice Breyer's dissent very largely agreed as
well."' The relevant facts which all tribunals cited were that the
California Dental Association had as members about 75 percent
of California dentists, with the number reaching as high as 90
percent in some areas; that membership in the California Dental
Association was highly valued;5 9 and that entry barriers into the
practice of dentistry were high.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust decision making and writing over the last twenty-
five years have added a great deal of structure to the rule of rea-
son in competitor collaboration cases. Over the years, the case
law has largely deserted the unbounded inquiry that Justice
Brandeis contemplated in his Chicago Board of Trade opinion. Is°
157 See id at 764, referring to California Dental Association, 128 F3d at 728-30; Cali-
fornia Dental Association, 120 FTC 190, 311-19 (1996).
158 California Dental Association, 526 US at 786-90 (Breyer dissenting).
159 On the importance of this criterion to associations having open membership, see
Hovenkamp, 13 Antitrust Law 2221a at 306-10 (cited in note 106). See also SCFC ILC,
Inc v Visa USA, Inc, 819 F Supp 956 (D Utah 1993) (holding that the evidence supported
jury conclusion that service association's bylaws, prohibiting issuer of competing card from
membership, restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act), revd, 36 F3d 958 (10th Cir
1994); Silver v NYSE, 373 US 341, 347 (1963) (invalidating, despite presence of other
federal regulations, actions of New York Stock Exchange as "a group boycott depriving
[non-members] of a valuable business service which they needed to compete effectively as
broker-dealers in the over-the-counter securities market").
160 See Board of Trade of City of Chicago v United States, 246 US 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable.
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In this sense, the majority opinion in California Dental Associa-
tion is a step back. The majority would like to see a broader in-
quiry into "reasonableness" than the Ninth Circuit reported, but
it provided both unfocused and unrealistic guidance as to the
substance of the missing queries. The Court provided nothing
resembling a road map or structure for a rule-of-reason examina-
tion.
Manageable rule-of-reason inquiries cannot hope to consider
all marginally relevant facts. But the majority remanded because
"the California Dental Association's advertising restrictions
might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or
possibly no effect at all on competition."'61
In explaining why a remand was important, the majority
suggested questions that are almost certainly impossible to an-
swer affordably and with acceptable certainty. For example, the
Court suggested that an empirical study might determine
whether announced discounts for first-time customers "would be
less effective at conveying information relevant to competition if
they listed the original and discounted prices for checkups, x-rays
and fillings, than they would be if they simply specified a per-
centage discount across the board."'62 It then surmised that in "a
suspicious world, the discipline of specific example may well be a
necessary condition of plausibility for professional claims that for
all practical purposes defy comparison shopping," and that it was
possible that "even if across-the-board discount advertisements
were more effective in drawing customers in the short run," repe-
tition of "misstatement due to the breadth of their claims might
... make potential patients skeptical of any such across-the-
board advertising."6 ' It also suggested that "across-the-board dis-
count advertisements would continue to attract business indefi-
nitely, but might work precisely because they were misleading
customers, and thus just because their effect would be anticom-
petitive, not procompetitive."'64
Such conjectures, if made in almost any market, might turn
up at least a small subset of true positives. Any discount advertis-
ing might conceivably mislead. Excessive discount advertising,
like the clothing store offering endless sales, might jade custom-
ers in almost any market. Most markets have less-than-perfect
161 California Dental Association, 526 US at 771.
162 Id at 774.
163 Id at 774-75.
164 Id at 775.
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information, and any restraint on advertising might serve to dis-
cipline a certain amount of unscrupulous as well as informative
advertising. But to launch the federal courts into such queries in
all cases involving advertising restraints imposed by self-
interested competitors, simply because we lack precise knowledge
about the result, will increase the costs of antitrust litigation con-
siderably, without providing comparable improvement in the re-
sults.
By contrast to the majority, Justice Breyer's dissent advo-
cated a much more structured inquiry. First, he would have de-
fined the restraints at issue, considering both what the California
Dental Association rules said and how they were interpreted.165
Second, he would have determined the reasonably anticipated
competitive consequences of such restraints.166 Third, assuming
significant competitive consequences were apparent, he would
have considered whether there were "offsetting procompetitive
justifications."'67 Fourth, he would have asked whether the de-
fendants had sufficient market power to "make a difference."6 8'
These queries could be worded in different ways or conducted
in a different sequence,'69 but the important point is that rule-of-
reason cases cannot become unstructured inquiries into thou-
sands of diverse facts which may or may not tell us something
about the competitive effects of the challenged practice. That,
Justice Breyer warned, would lead us back to the days when the
government or plaintiff "had to present and/or refute every possi-
ble fact and theory," preventing cases "from ever reaching a con-
clusion."7 ° And it would not be an improvement over the unstruc-
tured rule of reason that Justice Brandeis promoted seventy
years ago.




169 See, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: the Law of Compe-
tition and its Practice § 5.6c at 256-57 (West 2d ed 1999) (phrasing the queries slightly
differently and suggesting that the order may be adjusted for different circumstances).
170 California Dental Association, 526 US at 794 (Breyer dissenting) (citation omitted).
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